Technology, agency, critique:An interview with Claudia Aradau by Aradau, C. et al.
VU Research Portal
Technology, agency, critique
Aradau, C.; Hoijtink, M.; Leese, M.
published in
Technology and Agency in International Relations
2019
DOI (link to publisher)
10.4324/9780429463143-9
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Aradau, C., Hoijtink, M., & Leese, M. (2019). Technology, agency, critique: An interview with Claudia Aradau. In
M. Hoijtink, & M. Leese (Eds.), Technology and Agency in International Relations (pp. 188-203). (Emerging
Technologies, Ethics and International Affairs). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429463143-9
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 27. May. 2021
9 Technology, agency, critique
An interview with Claudia Aradau
Claudia Aradau, Marijn Hoijtink, &
Matthias Leese
MARIJN HOIJTINK (MH): The idea for this book was to take up developments in
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and New Materialism and the turn
towards these literatures in International Relations (IR), and to study the
question of agency more specifically with regard to IR and technology.
Claudia, you have been at the forefront of some of these discussions. In par-
ticular, your 2010 article on critical infrastructure protection in Security Dia-
logue is often referenced within the debates (Aradau, 2010). We wanted to
take a look back and see what we have gained from these discussions, and
we would be interested to know how you would evaluate the ways in which
STS and New Materialism approaches have inspired our work in IR.
CLAUDIA ARADAU (CA): Thank you very much for your generous words about
the article. I see three main ways in which the literatures on STS and
New Materialism are contributing to IR. The first can be seen as an inte-
gral part to the study of practices, and particularly to the study of
human/non-human assemblages. We have different vocabularies through
which to analyze these assemblages, and there is a long-standing debate
in IR about the implications of these types of analysis. One prevalent
criticism concerns methodological assumptions and premises: what it
means to be speaking of assemblages as ontologically “flat,” the question
of symmetry, and the politics that is implied when one talks about
human/non-human assemblages. But I think that the analytical attention
to human/non-human assemblages has led to very productive interven-
tions for IR despite these objections. It has not only highlighted different
modes of materiality, technologies, and non-humans, but it has also
unpacked the relational practices between humans and non-humans.
Moreover, I think, it has done away with very limiting debates in IR
about the “micro” and the “macro.” We have had this debate for some
time, but we now have much more productive ways of analyzing transver-
sal relations and understanding transversal modes of connecting in terms
of international practices.
Secondly, and I think this is one of the reasons your book is important,
another contribution was the reconsideration of performativity and
agency. Here, both questions of distributed and entangled agency have
been really important, and the chapters in the book take up these ques-
tions and discuss what they mean both methodologically and politically:
Georgios Glouftsios’s chapter about the Visa Information System (VIS),
for example, as he discusses modes of distributed agency; or Philipp
Olbrich’s chapter on satellite imagery. Agency is not new to IR. There
has been a lot of debate about it in post-structuralist, feminist, and post-
colonialist literature. But I think the idea of entanglement and of different
kinds of agency can really help us push forward some of these boundaries.
So we can build on these developments.
The third contribution concerns the politics of technology, of objects,
of devices. And an acknowledgment that debates about the liberal
subject, about liberal governmentality in IR need to be understood
as co-constitutive, or to use Sheila Jasanoff’s (2004) terminology that
several of the authors in this book invoke, as “co-produced” by objects,
technologies, and all of these mundane devices, social, and cultural
practices. I think this is really important for developing wider vocabu-
laries for politics, but also in terms of understanding the politics of tech-
nology. It does not mean that there would not be limitations to this
enlarged vocabulary of politics, and again, there have been a lot of
debates in IR about the limits of STS – and also some discussions in the
book touch upon this.
As you kindly mentioned my article from 2010, that article engages
the work of Karen Barad, and was really interested in the debates within
STS as well. STS is not a homogeneous field, and often we go back to
Actor-Network Theory, which is one of its forms. I think it is important to
actually be much more aware of the debates and disagreements within
STS. The chapter by Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Linda Monsees engages
with Jasanoff’s work, which is a particular strand in STS that is not based
on Latour and Callon, but develops a critique of their ANT approach.
And your own chapter, Matthias, uses Lucy Suchman’s (2007, 2012) work
on “configuration” to draw attention to the ways in which materialities
and imaginaries of technology are joined together. It is also necessary to
engage much more with feminist and post-colonial approaches in STS,
as there is a very rich body of work on technology, for example on repro-
ductive technologies, or ultrasound technologies, their circulations, and
political effects. And this brings back these distributed and entangled
modes of agency in relation to bodies, the production of knowledge, the
politics of (de)humanization, and so on. This work is deeply political, there
is nothing “flat” about these assemblages. “Flatness” is neither a meth-
odological precaution nor an assumption of the research.
MH: More recent work at the intersection of feminist and post-colonial stud-
ies and STS has taken up questions of what we have been doing away
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with: the micro/macro debate, differences between the global and the
local (e.g., Pollock and Subramaniam, 2016). And this literature also
looks at the global circulation of technologies, how technologies emerge,
how they become appropriated. This also seems an important thing that
these perspectives offer us.
CA: The circulation of technologies is an important aspect, indeed. And we
have a lot of work in IR, and more specifically in critical security studies,
that has addressed this. Circulations have been particularly understood as
subsumed by hierarchical power relations, so that we see circulation of
technologies from the North to the South, but also vice versa: that tech-
nologies developed in “laboratories” in the South find their way back to
the North. The topos of “laboratories of security” has been important
to challenge micro/macro distinctions and implicates a turn towards
the analysis of global/local encounters, translations, and circulations of
(in)security (e.g., Bourne et al., 2015). STS can be useful to unpack how
“laboratories of security” work in practice, how they differ from the sci-
entific laboratories and experimental science that STS has analyzed,
given also that we cannot just follow the techno-scientists, as Glouftsios’s
chapter shows. There is also a question about how we conceptualize
modes of circulation, and how we address these modes of circulation in
relation to global power relations. Marieke de Goede (2018: 24) has
proposed to approach this through the epistemic implications of the
“security chain,” focusing on how the modes of circulation of security
across public-private institutions entail processes of “sequencing, move-
ment, and referral in the production of security judgements.”
Another important aspect, and this is sometimes missing in STS work,
is the production of violence, the production of insecurity, the modes in
which (in)security is enacted. I think there is an understanding about the
effects that these practices and technologies have, the modes of insidious
violence, the modes of differential exclusion from these practices. It is
important to keep these questions as something that IR brings to this
conversation.
A final element is connected to the question of politics and how we
understand politics. Drawing on some of the critical resources in IR, I
think we should look into the politics of networks, particularly as
deployed in Actor-Network Theory (ANT). An approach that highlights
controversies, struggles, frictions, and disputes seems to me more apt to
grasp the politics of local and global, circulation and technology critically
(see Aradau, 2018; Hönke and Cuesta-Fernández, 2018). STS is grap-
pling with these questions, but I think the experiences from critical IR
and from critical security studies are really productive here. We should
not lose that.
MATTHIAS LEESE (ML): I would like to go back to your point about the risks of
homogenizing STS by reducing it to ANT and excluding other work such
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as feminist and post-colonial strands. On the other hand, we already have
numerous concepts and vocabularies that include the likes of dispositif,
assemblage, intra-action, co-production, or vibrancy – and you have in
your own work, together with Anthony Amicelle, and Julien Jeandesboz,
coined the notion of the “security device” (Amicelle et al., 2015). And all
these concepts come from different philosophical traditions and disciplin-
ary backgrounds. How can we grapple with that multitude and hetero-
geneity of vocabulary?
CA: My first reaction would be to say that I don’t worry about having too
many concepts. I would worry about having too few concepts. And this
relates to where IRwas starting. If you think about the dangers of what is
called “parsimonious theory,” we need more rather than fewer concepts
to grapple with the complexity and heterogeneity of the world. Parsimo-
nious theory tries to discipline analytical attention by reducing the com-
plexity of the world to alleged big matters and claiming that messiness is
untenable, ungraspable, and methodologically invalid. But I think your
point is important, because there is also a question about heterogeneity
becoming disorientation or confusion, when we have a massive prolifer-
ation of concepts. Still, different concepts do different work, and this is
why a multiplicity of concepts is important for me. Conceptual multipli-
city cannot be legislated before the research, but is enacted through the
process of research. As you say, concepts come from different debates,
and if you look back at this book as a whole, authors mobilize different
concepts in relation to different debates in order to be able to do certain
things. For instance, co-production, for Jacobsen and Monsees, is import-
ant, because it enables them to relate their analysis back to questions of
social order. They want to focus on the micro-practices and politics of
social order, and they can do so through the concept of co-production
and through Jasanoff’s work.
However, if you are starting from an understanding of controversy, this
does something different than a concept like social order, the analysis will
be very different. Even as Jasanoff is interested in the de- and re-stabiliza-
tion of social order, she distinguishes her approach from the study of
technoscientific controversies or boundary objects, as she focuses on tra-
cing the tacit assumptions, understandings, cultural and national differ-
ences that are constitutive of these moment of de-stabilization (Jasanoff,
2012). She is also interested in controversies in society rather than just
the laboratory. That is why it is crucial to not de-historicize these con-
cepts, and this is where the debates within STS are relevant. This is also
the case in engaging STS and IR, in terms of how, for example, co-pro-
duction as a concept is similar to, but not quite the same as enactment or
performativity. We need to situate the concepts we use in their socio-his-
torical contexts of emergence, but also to follow them through the
debates and circulations that redeploy and change them. There is a par-
ticular intervention, and this is about what kind of work these concepts
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allow us to do. Why do we invent concepts? We invent concepts to try to
make sense of the heterogeneity of practices. STS gives us a vocabulary
that we can use productively in relation to the vocabularies that we
already have, and end this myth of parsimony that IR (and social sci-
ences) have been reproducing for a long time. There are also other
vocabularies in critical IR – and vocabularies that we need to invent our-
selves, not as individual scholars who reproduce the “distinctions” of the
academic field, but as collaborative endeavors to engage critically with
the problems of insecurity, violence, and global politics that we want to
understand and confront.
ML: Others have also pointed at the presumed incompatibility of different
levels of analysis between STS and IR. STS comes from a sociological
and ethnographic tradition, where researchers have paid close attention
to very specific and local practices, and situated networks of actors. IR,
on the other hand, is a discipline that is still preoccupied with the notion
of the international and the quite abstract question of change versus con-
tinuity. So it could be argued that STS and IR are not really compatible
when it comes to international practices. How can we try to bridge
this gap?
CA: Let me turn back to something that interested me a few years ago, as I
hope it is relevant to the question. In the early days of the Cold War,
there was a big debate about avoiding accidental war between the two
great powers. And one of the key responses was to have a hotline between
Moscow and Washington. And this hotline is key. You can conduct a
whole analysis – I tried to do this a couple years ago, and there is in fact
a lot of literature on this – about putting the hotline in practice and its
political implications: what does it take to make the hotline as an assem-
blage work? You see, a hotline is a quite banal thing. But it brings into
being a very particular understanding of global war, of nuclear warfare, a
particular understanding of what it means to have relations between
global powers, who gets to be connected through the hotline and who
doesn’t (Aradau, 2016). Its banality also means that mundane actions,
which appear to be at a distance from international politics such as a
Finnish farmer cutting the hotline while ploughing the land become con-
stitutive of the international. So we can turn your question around to
some extent, and ask: how do we study the enactment of the
international?
The international is enacted in many different sites. It is not a given,
but it is constituted through practices. Concepts from STS can be pro-
ductively mobilized to study and understand the enactment of the inter-
national through the production of particular discourses, institutions,
practices, routines, but also objects such as hotlines, railways, infrastruc-
tures, logistics, weapons, and also expertise. This is why I like the “trans-
versal,” as it allows us to understand how the international is enacted
and re-enacted. Transversal is not transnational but that which connects
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by cutting across in more or less unexpected ways. There are heteroge-
neous enactments and re-enactments, but also controversies about what
the international is and how, and where, it comes into being. Or contro-
versies about, and struggles over, what counts as the international and
what counts as the global. These are often subject to controversies, and
objects and technologies are part of these controversies and contestations.
Olbrich, in his chapter, for example looks at the imagination and enact-
ment of the global through technology and the particular production of
images of the globe. Or we could also analyze technologies that enact
the “world.” What does it mean to look at the world? Again, there is a
history of that: world future, the Club of Rome, and so on. So there is a
whole history of attempting to produce the world. And the same goes for
the international. There is a history of doing that through the modes of
inscription, through different practices and so on.
MH: You mentioned that we should keep our IR understanding of politics:
what politics is about, what it does, and also what it means to do critical
work in IR and critical security studies. In STS, many scholars would
follow a Latourian approach to politics and assume that politics is what
the actors within a network define as politics. And their forms of political
engagement or political critique would be based on observing the rela-
tionships within the network, and subsequently engaging the actors and
speaking with them about their observations in a very detailed and
nuanced manner. How would that work for us, when we study phenom-
ena such as exclusion or violence, also with regard to possibly holding
human/non-human assemblages accountable for these things? In other
words, is our understanding of politics in IR compatible with the under-
standing of politics in STS?
CA: I think your question about politics is closely related to debates about cri-
tique and how to locate critique within entangled relations between a
multitude of “actants.” It is also important to acknowledge that there is
not a shared concept of politics, either in IR as a whole, or in critical
IR. So again, if we start from the traditional debate about politics and
understandings about what liberal or realist understandings of politics
entail – or also in terms of post-structuralist understandings of politics –
you have a lot of variation in how politics is understood: from Foucault’s
politics as war to a host of other post-structural understandings of polit-
ics as contingency. Contingency is a concept that I have noticed across
several of the chapters in the book. There is politics within contingency,
but also of contingency. And then you have debates about politics and
resistance, politics as resistance, politics as contestation, politics as con-
troversy. This is connected with an understanding of contingency and the
possibilities and indeterminacies of social practices that open up the pos-
sibility of contesting politics. Therefore, there are a lot of connections
that we can make, while again attending to the heterogeneity of different
understandings of politics. We need to pay close attention to the sites of
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political contestation and how politics and critique are enacted in contro-
versies within and across those sites. But we need to be careful not to
remain just within the understanding of politics that actors have within a
specific situation. To me, this means to take seriously what STS does, but
also to think across different sites, to not remain confined to a social situ-
ation. And I think this is where critical IR is interesting. Because we
“move” a lot, producing understandings of transversality and circulation,
an understanding of the sedimentation and transformation of discourses,
an understanding of global power relations. We move across different
sites, and throughout these sites the understandings of politics shift as
well.
We also need to attend to the understandings of politics that we have
in our IR, even as we find some problematic. To a certain extent, we are
also actors, within and across this trans-academic field. So I think it is
important to work with this, and work across, work at the interstices,
work in-between. This means that we can step beyond the confines of a
situation, and there are openings, and under-determinacies, and contin-
gencies, and failures in situations. Practices are contested, (re)deployed,
and (re)appropriated. And all this has been very productive for IR and
for STS. But I think we can move beyond, and sometimes we need to
move beyond, the understandings of politics in a specific situation. This
is the methodological view of proximity and distance (Bueger and Mir-
eanu, 2015; Coleman and Hughes, 2015). In that sense, we cannot just
erase or disavow the whole history of thinking about politics that we have
been trained in, that we have learned, that we work with. We can bring
that to particular situations, while at the same time being more attentive
to absences and silences. Or to that which might be non-perceptible in a
given situation, to use Jacques Rancière’s (1999) terms, to the distribution
of the sensible and the political moment of redistributing the sensible.
Working upon and contesting this distribution of the sensible, I think
there we can have something to say without assuming that we are an
equal actor, or have some kind of similar position, but still bring our his-
tory of thinking about politics into particular situations.
MH: This reminds me of a story about Bruno Latour giving a lecture in
Taiwan and reminding his audience of the importance of symmetry, rela-
tionality, and contingency in our research (Law and Lin, 2017: 214–5).
Latour explained that we can only make sense of the world if we adopt
methods that are themselves non-coherent and messy, but he was chal-
lenged by his audience who told him that messiness and the struggle
against a grand narrative was not at all productive with regard to the pol-
itical situation in Taiwan. I guess what this example shows is that when
STS prescribes that all knowledge is situated, this cannot itself become a
decontextualized truth. John Law and Wen-yuan Lin, who recount this
story about Latour’s lecture, then go on to call for extending the principle
of symmetry further, treating non-Western and STS terms of analysis
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symmetrically without privileging the latter, but before that perhaps what
we need is understand the political work that our own concepts, such as
messiness and contingency, do.
CA: That is where the question of politics becomes a question of problematiz-
ing contingency and messiness. Why and how is something problematized
in a given context, and on the basis of what kind of understandings of
politics? I cannot speak to the debates about politics in Taiwan or what
was implied in the question to Latour, as this is not something I am
familiar with, but I can see that contingency can be problematized differ-
ently in specific political situations. For instance, problematizing contin-
gency can open political space against consensual politics, or dominant
representations, which silence or exclude other voices or, to put it differ-
ently, lead to epistemic injustice or rendering some types of knowledge and
knowledge subjects as lacking credibility. This is what critical security stud-
ies and critical IR more generally – and most explicitly feminist work –
have done. But perhaps we can also say that – to a certain extent – we are
now faced with a different situation, where contingency seems to render
political judgments indefinitely changeable to that extent that the language
of “post-truth” has become increasingly used. Contingency is here ren-
dered as “anything goes” rather than a socio-historical conceptualization
of relations. Contingency does not mean that a situation or relations are
indeterminate, rather that they are not fully determined. Therefore, con-
tingency is mobilized to create confusion, doubt and uncertainty, as the
literature on agnotology has shown (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008). We
need to develop transversal modes of analysis, which situate contin-
gency as a socio-historical concept and practice and also move across
sites of controversy, rather than just having one understanding of what
the politics of contingency is. Agnotology seems to me a more apt toolbox
for diagnosing and intervening in the present than the problematic coinage
of “post-truth.”
ML: I’d like to pick up on your discussion of critique. You mentioned that
there is a debate, in critical IR and critical security studies, about what it
means to be critical, and what the implications from a critical stance
would need to be. For you, what does it mean to be critical in relation to
technology, and how can we accommodate the normative or the ethical
within a critical stance towards technology and the international?
CA: That is a difficult question. Let me try to split it into two parts. The first
one is how we can think about being critical in relation to technology and
technological developments. And then I’ll address the question of ethics.
I have thought about the question of critique as always a situated one.
Critique in relation to technology needs to be situated and specified:
what kind of technology are we speaking about? It needs to come after
an analysis of power, controversy, and agency. So, for me, critique does
not come first, but it builds upon an understanding of power relations, of
the modes of differential exclusion, of the modes of silencing, of the
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struggles and controversies that take place, of the controversies that
can mobilize objects and subjects, the technologies but also the subjects
that are involved. We need to try to understand how these things produce
forms of differential exclusion, but also distributions of humanity
and inhumanity, the construction of categories of some people as less-
than-human. And it is on this understanding of inequality, differential
exclusions, dehumanizations, and injustices that critique builds.
It seems to me that in critical security studies, and I take the liberty of
including feminist and post-colonial approaches here as well, this is
very important as a mode of analysis and as an understanding of cri-
tique. It is, I think, a quite specific understanding of critique, quite dif-
ferent from some of the analyses in ANT, for example. This is how I
would specify critique. And I would take critique in this “negative”
sense that it builds upon an understanding of what produces differences
and inequalities, power asymmetries, violence, and injustice. There has
been a move in new materialist work to develop modes of “affirmative”
critique, which are situated in relation to “negative” critique. Yet, this is
not a positively/negatively charged continuum. To me, it is a question of
situating critique in relation to the production of injustice, inequality,
domination and so. That is why I feel ambiguous about formulations of
“post-critique” and “a-critique,” which take the “negative” critique I
have outlined as somehow violent itself (e.g., Anker and Felski, 2017).
And critique then enters as a mode of reasoning. Critique is not the
same as politics, but I connect critique and politics, because I think cri-
tique can be a site of politics. It builds upon political struggle, but it can
itself be mobilized, and anticipate political struggle. For me, what is
really important is that if you take this analysis of the different modes
of relations and the effect that technologies have in the classification of
humans and the creation of categories of being human or non-human,
then politics is about contesting that.
Therefore, in my work, I have spoken about politics rather than ethics.
We have seen debates that have attempted to formulate different ethical
approaches and different normative approaches, and we can talk about
that. But I wonder whether ethics – particularly as it is discussed in rela-
tion to technology and emerging digital technologies – risks eschewing
what politics is about: engaging, coming to grips, entering, working
within the interstices, and controversies. To some extent, I worry that
ethics does not allow for that messiness. Formulations of ethics in relation
to technology are particularly problematic in that sense, as they assume
that ethics can be “designed in” the technology or that somehow ethics is
matter of rules. An ethics which inscribes particular universal rights in
the technology design does not only decontextualize the subjects of tech-
nologies, but it imagines a universal and non-situated subject of technol-
ogy. Here, ethics offers solutions and aims for sameness across all
deployments of technology. Yet, I would argue that what we need are not
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solutions but new problematizations. We need a political sociology of
contestations: of controversies, struggles, resistances, disagreements, and
disputes.
ML: If you would allow me to relate this back to your own work once more:
together with Tobias Blanke, and with regard to Big Data and security,
you write “what matters in the Big Data-security assemblage is how the
relation between humans and computers gains content, and how the
assembling of humans and computers is both an association and a div-
ision of labour” (Aradau and Blanke, 2015: 5). How can we understand
this division of labor between machines on the one hand, and humans on
the other hand, particularly if we think about the violent and exclusion-
ary effects that you spoke about earlier?
CA: Your question refers to two terms. The first one is labor. A lot of the
debates about the role of digital technologies, Big Data, and algorithms are
about the production of value, about labor that produces this value, and
about capitalism. You can see this, for example, in Malcolm Campbell-Ver-
duyn’s chapter on blockchain technology, where you see the re-working of
the blockchain within dominant systems of finance and liberal capitalism.
The concept of labor is really important because we need to analyze the
effects of digital technologies and computers in relation to the production
of value. Alex Edney-Browne’s chapter also shows the effects of labor –
long shifts, the strain of fatigued vision, and multi-tasking – for drone
pilots and the fatal consequences that the human-machine distribution of
vision can entail for those who become targets of violence.
I think it is here that we need to connect the work on security technolo-
gies, devices, logistics or infrastructures done in CSS or STS with feminist
scholarship. For instance, in her work on gestational surrogacy, Kalindi
Vora starts with the clinic as a sort of laboratory that disciplines women
through technologies of surrogacy, legal contracts, and training. She is
particularly interested in how women are guided into “a new understand-
ing of their bodies without their full knowledge of the technologies
involved to train them into a previously unimagined relationship (or lack
of relationship) to the child they will bear” (Vora, 2015: 109). Vora’s ana-
lysis is exemplary in connecting technology, (not) knowing, gendered,
and racialized embodiment.
The other element that is important for both politics and critique is
how relations get specified. Often, when we talk about agency or assem-
blages, we talk about relational approaches. Again, this is something that
several authors discuss in the book. But the relational is a vague concept.
And while it is productive to have many different concepts, these relation-
ships need to be specified. In the article that you referred to, we take ser-
iously a criticism that the geographer John Allen (2011) raised towards
the uses of the concept of assemblage, and particularly towards assem-
blages being used as too descriptive and focused on their elements. So his
argument is that we need to work through the content of the relations
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within the assemblage, and that we need to specify these relations. That is
what we tried to do: specifying and historicizing relations. But how do we
do that? We specify them within the controversies that take place around
questions such as what Big Data is, how it works, what it means in prac-
tice – an approach that Mareile Kaufmann also takes in her chapter in
this volume. We trace a series of controversies, starting from the Snowden
revelations and including judicial litigation and public scandals. And
then you can see, if you follow controversies, how violence is problem-
atized in relation to Big Data. To go back to Vora’s analysis, she also
shows how an analysis of relations cannot be limited to the surrogacy
clinic but also needs to be placed within both a historical context of “the
Indian middle class and rural women” and a global one of “the trans-
national reach of directors, and their ability to command technology and
resources at the global level” (Vora, 2015: 114).
For us, the “association and division of labour between humans and
computers” was helpful to orient our approach. There is violence in how
Amazon Mechanical Turk, for example, works as low-paid workers in the
South are given “tasks” that supplement the work of computers. The div-
ision of labor is also international, with low-paid workers and a lack of
labor rights. There is violence in how anomalies are produced, as anom-
aly detection has become the “holy grail” for detecting unknowns in the
mass of data. There are different modes of inclusive exclusion, of classifi-
cation, and hierarchization, which also embody violence. But at the same
time, specifying the content, and that takes us also to your own chapter
in the book, Matthias, also prevents us from falling into the trap of all
kinds of dystopian visions of machines and automation taking over, this
discourse around Artificial Intelligence and a world run by robots which
I think is actually undermining critical discourse.
MH: I think what we find in many chapters of the book is that they look at
how those relationships take shape, but also at what the effects of those
relationships and constellations are. So while I think it is very important
to specify relations and their content, it is also important to study what
the effects of such relationships are: for example, in terms of how North
Korea is depicted (Olbrich), how the blockchain is re-appropriated within
financial regulation (Campbell-Verduyn), or how practices of warfare are
transformed through the visual regime of the drone (Edney-Browne).
One of the premises of this book, in this sense, is to show what the effects
of those constellations are.
CA: A critical analysis of technology emerges through the diagnosis of effects,
particularly as we understand technologies as socio-technical assemblages,
and unpacking the specific relations through which agency emerges.
Several of the chapters take this approach, but push it in different direc-
tions. Take for instance Olbrich’s chapter about satellite imagery and
North Korea. What is important here is that these effects are mobilized in
the production of evidence. And this is again a key element if we think
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about the international politics of knowledge and about how human rights
abuses and other forms of violence can be known or not. The production
of evidence, what counts as evidence, is key. But Olbrich shows how the
production of evidence is asymmetrical, and I think he has an important
point there, also methodologically, about the question of symmetry/asym-
metry, which has often been used in IR to criticize STS. While for the
critics symmetry appears to eschew the asymmetries of power, Olbrich’s
chapter points out that it does not mean that “human beings, things, insti-
tutions and concepts matter in the same way.” In my reading, I would say
that there is a methodological precaution of not accepting asymmetries as
given a priori.
And in Campbell-Verduyn’s chapter on blockchain you have the ques-
tion of authority in global financial regulation. Again, this is the effect of
asymmetries and it is produced through specific relations. So we really
need to focus on the production of asymmetric relations of power and
authority, but also on asymmetric forms of knowledge. And we extend
this to the production of what counts as evidence, what counts as truth,
who gets to speak, who gets to be an actor in particular situations, who
gets to be human, who gets to be an expert, and so on. All these ques-
tions are underpinned by particular relations, but also by the equipment
and instruments that these actors can have and appropriate.
ML: There is quite a debate in terms of how to study these relations empiric-
ally, specifically when it comes to technology. Most technologies are
either framed as security technologies and therefore subject to a certain
level of secrecy and inaccessibility, or they are the products of private
companies and therefore proprietary, which makes them also to a certain
extent inaccessible for us as researchers. How can we deal with this prob-
lematic constellation if we seek to study the relations that unfold from
and through technologies?
CA: First of all, and I think this is very important, we should also study
secrecy itself. Secrecy is also a particular mode or relation, where
something is not unknown, or unknowable, but it is kept from certain
people. If no one knows it, then there is no secrecy. It is a really inter-
esting epistemic concept, because it partitions and distributes know-
ledge, and creates particular boundaries. And that raises the question
of where the researcher sits in relation to these boundaries, and how
you can do research on particular technologies that are secret and to
which you don’t have access. There are two elements I want to
address. One is that secrecy is not just about security or international
relations. I think secrecy is perhaps intensified in relation to security
technologies, but security has become a very mundane task. As you
said, it is tied to the proprietary technologies of private companies
that have a lot of secrecy around the development of their products,
partly due to competition. That is the metaphor of the “black box”
that Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979) used to develop the
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methodology of “opening the black box” and which is now widely used to
render the challenges digital technologies and algorithms, and you have
also used it in your work on profiling (Leese, 2014). Frank Pasquale has
even coined the term “black box society” (Pasquale, 2015). Secrecy is
produced in many different forms. Academics produce secrecy in the
research process as confidentiality, anonymization, and so on. There are
many modes of secrecy, but in the end it is often quite banal. So we need
to work with this banality of secrecy. And one thing is: could we render it
more banal in relation to security, rather than thinking that there is always
something exceptional in relation to security?
Secondly, how do we do the research then? If secrecy is banal, this
means that the field is quite dispersed, and there are a lot of boundaries,
and you can work around those boundaries. And you have different ways
of working around these lines, for example, anthropologists like Hugh
Gusterson have been working around nuclear weapons, quite literally.
Gusterson (1997: 116) develops the methodology “polymorphic engage-
ment,” thereby multiplying the sites of inquiry and “collecting data eclec-
tically from a disparate array of sources in many different ways.” Tobias
Blanke and I have argued that many technologies are not as secret as we
think they are. To give you an example: there is a lot of secrecy around
the technologies that intelligence agencies use. We do not know exactly
what the NSA [National Security Agency] is doing with data, and what
kinds of technologies they have available. However, it is very unlikely that
the NSA will have technologies that are more developed than the state-
of-the-art in computer science. This is what whistleblowers and leaks
have also shown. We also know that there are only a limited number of
classes of algorithms, so we can build on this. Finally, if you look at the
modes of research funding, for example within the DARPA [Defence
Advanced Research Projects Agency], a lot of the academics involved in
this research for security purposes then go on and publish articles about
it. And let’s not forget that there are the public controversies around
leaks and what has come to be called the “half-life of secrets.”
So I think there are different ways in which one can do research, and
to think differently about secrecy. What is key here is to treat it as less
exceptional. But also to think about discursivity around technologies.
When the Snowden revelations came out, of course, there was a huge
debate about the secrecy, but also some intelligence experts said that
they were quite happy that they could finally publicly talk about what
they were doing.
MH: I think this is also something that some of the chapters work with and
highlight: that we should not be looking for secrets in one single space, or
chamber of secrets, but that there are ways to work around it and to find
data in different places, and to connect these dots in order to be able to
tell a convincing story. For example, Georgios Glouftsios suggests that
we study the meetings where “bureaucrats, policymakers, security
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professionals, legal and technology experts meet to discuss technoscienti-
fic, policy, and security-related needs and concerns.”
CA: Yes, this is also Gusterson’s point about polymorphic engagements. But
there is a lure of secrecy, which is exactly that of making visible, of dis-
covering that which is hidden. The recent literature on “post-critique”
has raised objections to this analysis of “surface and depth.” Contra this
surface/depth reading, Toril Moi’s chapter in the Anker and Felski edited
anthology on Critique and Post-Critique proposes to “develop critical
readings without invoking terms like hermeneutics of suspicion, or symp-
tomatic reading” (Moi, 2017: 32; emph. in orig.). She rejects the surface/
depth opposition, which leads to an epistemology of revealing and
making visible. Your suggestion, Marijn, is about the heterogeneous
surfaces and interstices where secrecy is enacted, but also contested.
There is another element in relation to secrecy, which is based on the
assumption that making something visible is equivalent to knowing. Yet,
technology is also opaque and often difficult to understand for experts
themselves. So the idea of seeing the technology, or having access to the
technology, will not necessarily dispel secrecy.
MH: If we think of the chapters of the book as an invitation to have a conver-
sation about technology and agency in IR, what would be your take on
how to productively push this conversation further? In other words,
where do you think we, disciplinarily speaking, should go next, where is
there still some uncharted territory left for the study of technology?
CA: We need to think about several things. One element concerns the notion of
laboratories, and the ways in which technologies are produced in laborator-
ies. So how can we think about the production of technologies in relation to
the use of technologies? And I think there is something really interesting in
the notion of the laboratory. It has been used almost as a metaphor in some
of the critical work on security, for example as some work engages the
laboratories in the Global South where technologies are produced, used and
tested and then these come back to the Global North, and so on. So, on the
one hand, it is interesting to engage with laboratories and the production of
technology and to revisit what counts as a laboratory today. On the other, it
is important to do transversal analyses, to move outside of the laboratory,
as Kalindi Vora shows us. Security is not “laboratory studies,” however
important laboratories are for the production of security technologies.
Laboratory work always moves out in terms of experiments, but also in
terms of inscriptions, in terms of publications. This speaks to a transversal
analysis of the modes of circulation and connection.
Secondly, we need to think about how important technologies actually
are in the partition of the sensible today: what we can see and know, and
what we cannot see or know without technology. This does not mean
that technology becomes immediately knowable, and there are no contro-
versies about what counts as knowledge, what counts as evidence. These
three sets of elements raise important questions today. And we can see
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them for example in relation to climate change – and not just simply cli-
mate change, but how do we know, or perhaps not know that and how
certain events are taking place? How is uncertainty produced, and
through what kinds of technologies? There is a lot more that we can
explore with regard to these relations.
And finally, the concept of agency is really important, because it con-
nects us to critical work on agency. We talked about feminist work, about
post-colonial work, and I think agency is a really important bridge to
work in-between these approaches, for example between feminist work in
IR and feminist work in STS. Agency allows these bodies of work to
make explicit their stakes and political investments in the reconfigur-
ations of social and power relations.
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